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CHAIRMAN ALAN ROBBINS:

I'd ask everyone to take a seat.

This is the latest that the

Senate Insurance Committee has ever started a hearing. But because of the importance of our guests
today, we'll live with that one blemish on our punctuality record.
This is a joint hearing of the Senate Insurance, Claims and Corporations Committee, the Senate
Transportation Committee, and the Senate Judiciary Committee.

There are a number of Members

who are coming who unfortunately have been delayed by the visit in town and the luncheon that's
taking place with a group of professional football players from San Francisco. Pardon? The people
who are standing in front of them need insurance.

But they will be -- a number of our other

legislators will be joining us in addition to Senator Kopp at my right who's Chair of the Senate
Transportation Committee; to my left is Senator Davis who sits as a Member of the Senate Insurance
Committee; Assemblyman Lloyd Connelly who's joined us at our request; Assemblyman Tom Hayden
who's joined us at our request, and Senator Cecil Green who .sits on the Senate Insurance Committee.
Let me say just very briefly that our Committee has taken very seriously its task of working on
the implementation of Proposition 103. It has certainly dramatically changed, not only insurance law
in California but indeed I think the entire political picture surrounding insurance in California. And
as a result of its passage, I think more and more Members of the Legislature are interested in the
subject of insurance. Many Members who, a year ago, rarely had any understanding of what the word
meant except that it's name was usually in the name of some insurance company that was on their
contributor list. Today, more legislators are interested and I think it has given a renewed spirit to
those of us who have been interested in the issue in the past but who are now, have a stirred
electorate to assist in the area of insurance reform.
With us today for the Committee are two gentlemen who really need no introduction but you'll
get a brief one anyhow. Harvey Rosenfield and Ralph Nader were the cosponsors of Proposition 103
in our state. It was approved by the electorate.
Mr. Nader, of course, has been a consumer spokesperson for years on the national level, has
been known to voters in the State of California. And if I may give my own surmise, the fact that two
of the propositions that were sponsored on the ballot were sponsored by the insurance companies and
two were sponsored by the trial lawyers and one was sponsored by Ralph Nader. I don't know if this is
a great compliment, but you're more popular than the insurance companies or the trial lawyers in the
State of California. I take that back.

Three were sponsored by the insurance companies; one was

sponsored by the trial lawyers and one was sponsored by Mr. Nader. And Mr. Nader, you're definitely
more popular than those two entities.

But even more so than that, despite the fact that tens of

millions of dollars was spent on the campaign against Proposition 103, the voters chose to take a
chance on the brand that you had endorsed.
Harvey Rosenfield is, of course, a very familiar part of our Committee and has been gracious
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enough to participate in all of our hearings on the implementation of Proposition 103, has not
hesitated when necessary to prod the Members of this Committee or the Chair of this Committee and
has become a genuine local folk hero here in California, somewhat akin to Howard Jarvis and what he
did with Proposition 1], that has litE-rally chang0d tlw conn"pt of h,,\\'

tlllt<·h

l:ntng V.•'\'<'rnm,•nl ,·,m

get away with over the last ten years.
Having said all of those nice things, I'd like to turn the mike over to you and perhaps to have
you give us maybe about a 15-minute summary of your perspective, or longer, if you wish, and then
the Members of the Committee and the-- I mean the legislators that we've asked to sit in with us-will be given the opportunity to ask you whatever questions they have.

So through an exchange, we

will seek the truth and hear the information and hear what you have to say.
Mr. Nader, the mike is yours.
MR. RALPH NADER: Thank you, Senator Robbins and Members of the Committee on Insurance
Claims and Corporations. I have -- sorry. The Committee on Transportation and Judiciary, and the
two Assemblymen. Have I covered everybody?
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: You could just say "and Senator Kopp".
MR. NADER: I'd like to submit for the record my complete testimony which covers both the
reasons why conditions led to 103 and how 103 was enacted, what 103 means, not only here in
California but around the country, as well as the characterization of the insurance industry's
response, both pre- and post-103.

There's also an attached letter that I've written to Chairman

James Lynn of Aetna Insurance Company focusing on loss prevention and a copy of an article I wrote
in Suffolk Law Review on the issue of the insurance industry's obligation to become the sentinels for
health and safety as part of their loss prevention responsibilities.
I'd like to submit all that for the record, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, and then
summarize some of the points that I wish to make today.
I want to thank you for the invitation to discuss Proposition 103 and the impact that it had, not
only on California consumers, businesses, nonprofits, municipalities, but also throughout the nation,
its energizing repercussions as citizens mobilized in state after state and to follow the leadership of
the voters of California in bringing the insurance industry to greater levels of disclosure, greater
levels of accountability, and higher levels of loss prevention standards.
It does seem, however, that the insurance companies are behaving as if the Supreme Court of

California has stayed the entire Proposition 103 instead of two provisions.
as if the voters of California hadn't approved 103.

They're behaving almost

We're seeing here, in almost uniformally

institutional defiance of Proposition 103 by insurance companies, not only in not taking advantage of
certain marketing opportunities, such as moving to sell group auto and group homeowner insurance
policies throughout the state, which Prop. 103 now permits, having repealed the past restrictions in
California's law against those kinds of group purchasing practices, but they also seem to be engaged
in a process of huffing and puffing and intimidation and threatening to pull out of the state or
canceling policies, not renewing policies, and recently, actually increasing insurance premium rates in
some instances.
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They are being aided and abetted in this institutional defiance of Prop. 103 by probably one of
the most lackidaisical insurance commissioners that I've ever had the displeasure to observe
throughout these United States, Roxani Gillespie, who, of course, made no secret of her antipathy and
antagonism for Prop. 103 before election day in November.

And, of course, her supervisor,

Governor Deukmejian who, again, made no secret of his opposition to Prop. 103 before the voters
rendered their verdict and since then they've certainly been lukewarm in instructing the Insurance
Commissioner to begin enforcing all those provisions of 103 which have not been stayed by the
Supreme Court of California.
Now this, of course, is leading to an attitude among many people in the state that can be
characterized at in some segments of the population as anger, indignation, and the demand that this
proposition be enforced.

Other segments of the population have become more fatalistic, more

resigned, saying, "What good is our vote?

We voted Prop. 103 in and we haven't seen its provisions

implemented." Other people have an even more withdraw! characteristic in this repect of what kind
of resignation as to whether it makes any difference to vote at all.

These kinds of feedbacks have

been coming into the canvassers who are going door to door for Voter Revolt. And I think that they
tell us that there's an added dimension here that should not be ignored, and that is, when people vote
into law, they expect their elected representatives to move, to all dispatch in support of this law,
having the kind of public hearings that you've been having, and they expect the executive branch to
do likewise, as the Attorney General has been doing, John Van de Kamp. And if they don't see this,
they can go one of both ways, one of two ways:

One, they can become very resigned and turn off,

which is not good for democracy; or they can become tremendously aggressive in moving for a major
follow-up drive, which may not be good for many elected representatives.
So I think it is important that you recognize that there's a tremendous relia.-·1ce on that vote in
November on behalf of Prop. 103, its 2.0 percent cut, reduction, in insurance rates as of November of

1987. It's exposing the antitrust law enforcement against these companies who've been engaged in a
great deal of ratemaking collusion, and having an elected Insurance Commissioner in requiring prior
approval of any auto insurance and other liability commercial insurance rate increases before the
selected insurance commissioner, and encouragement of group buying of auto and homeowner
insurance, in addition to requiring disclosure by the insurance companies of information so that never
again these companies can go trying to whipsaw the public into submission underneath their arbitrary
classifications, their discrimination, their massive reliance on territorial rating, and their underreliance on good-driver record.
So we now, of course, have to await the Supreme Court of California's decision, knowing full
well that it's a much more business-oriented court than it was two years ago.

We also have to look

forward to the utilization of the provisions of Prop. 103, as we did yesterday with a Senior Center in
Southern California where hundreds of senior citizens demonstrated their determination to start
banding together and demanding that they be sold group auto insurance policies which will lead to
significant cutbacks in insurance rates because the economies of scale and the

absence of

promotional and advertising expenses to land such customers and the ability of group auto insurers
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to -- insureds, rather, to -- bargain with the various insurance companies bidding for their
business -- all of these factors certainly foresee a significant reduction in auto insurance rates and, I
might add, the same pattern with obtaining homeowner insurance rates.
Now I'd like to point out that the insurance companies have continually postured after any
defeat in any state.

They did this in Florida when they were forced to roll back their rates. They

threatened to pull out of Florida. They threatened to cancel. They huffed and they puffed and the
state government stood firm, and the insurance companies got over their withdrawal pains and they
resumed their normal pattern of business.
I was just speaking with an insurance agent/broker in a Washington, D.C., suburbs and he said,
"You know, it really is amazing the way these insurance companies postured right after Prop. 103
won." He said, "But now they're doing business, and they know that they're going to still make money
in California."

He said, "Even we, we opened an office last year in California.

We thought, gee,

Prop. 103, maybe we shouldn't have opened the office." He said, "We're doing very well." I think he
might have even been more candid because a few minutes later, when I was discussing the reinsurance
companies, he launched into this tirade against Lloyd's of London and other reinsurers and they say,
"We're still not moderating their rates and are still whipsawing the primary insurers

with

repercussions to customers all over the country," to which I said, "Well, don't you think the reinsurers
ought to be under similar disclosure and regulation as the primary insurers, especially the offshore
insurers like Lloyd's of London?" He said, "Absolutely."
And that's one of my first recommendations to you, Mr. Chairman, is that you initiate what no
other state has yet initiated, and that is, an investigation to Lloyd's of London as the lead and
dominant reinsurer whose practices and policies are followed by reinsurers as far away as Munich Re
and Swiss Re, in Western Europe, to domestically based reinsurers in the United States.

The

reinsurance factor is very key to launching these gyrations in the insurance cycle, destablizing the
primary insurers, who then transfer the destablization onto the day care centers, the trucking firms,
the doctors, the hospitals, as well as auto owners and other consumers throughout the state.

The

Congress certainly should do this as well. But if the Congress is g0ing to drag its feet, the way it has
been on reinsurance over the last several years, why not start with the next best thing in terms of
size, which is the State of California?
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Let me ask you briefly on the subject of reinsurance. We had started to
tackle it, and this Committee has taken an interest sometime in reinsurance, two years ago, of
proposed legislation that was defeated, like many bills are by the insurance companies, to limit
reinsurance and to require that at least 10 percent of any policy be retained by the company writing
the policy rather than to reinsure 100 percent of the policy in order to get some degree of
responsibility with the company issuing the policy.
Other than that type of legislation, what else can specifically be done at the state level to deal
with the reinsurance companies, most of whom are international in scope?
MR. NADER:

Well, first of all, I understand the trend is in the reverse, that is, the primary

insurers are having to swallow a larger portion of the risks.
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Now let me answer your question with one prefatory remark.
release its annual profits, except three years later.

Lloyd's of London does not

In other words, they just released their 1985

profits. In 1985, Lloyd's of London was screaming poverty, near bankruptcy, inability to underwrite
risks because of runaway juries, judges, and lawyers in the United States of America. Just a few days
ago, they released their 1985 profits, record profits. And one can only imagine what their 1986 and
'87 profits are going to be because that's been a curve in the primary markets have been, record
profits.
Secondly, here's what California can do:

They can require Lloyd's of London to justify their

reinsurance criteria so that when Lloyd's of London says, "Sorry, we're going to have to sock it to a
nonprofit group of board of directors, and we're going to have to sock it to day care center
reinsurance," you can say to Lloyd's of London, under a new California law, "Prove it.

How much

have you taken in from day care center reinsurance? How much have you paid out? How much have
you reserved?

And where's the rest of the money?"

So disclosure, a whole series of disclosure

requirements, is important there as well.
I think also you can press them to release their financial data more currently. You know, they
have tremendous leverage over regulators, when they can say they're losing money and they don't
have to show it until three years later. And they got away with a lot of arm twisting in this country
because I'm afraid too many state legislators believed them.

Of course, Lloyd's did suffer losses in

that year in hurricanes and other things not related to liability. But that's not the liability part that's
part of the problem. And I might add, that even though they suffered these hurricane losses, they've
always made money. Lloyd's, by the way, is not a corporation. It's a collection of partnerships where
wealthy people invest $150,000 and up. They become members and it's a tremendous tax advantage.
You get these wealthy people from all over the world to join, and they've been expanding their
capacity rapidly in the last year.
We have finished a report on Lloyd's of London about eight months ago.

I also want to make

sure that the Committee ...
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I would like to have Lloyd's of London referred to California, actually,
to the liability system of California, as the Black Hole of California at one point, a few years ago. I
think it would be entirely appropriate for this Committee to invite Lloyd's of London to have the
opportunity to come forward and provide the answers to all of the questions that you're asking and to
provide the documented information on their losses and profits.
MR. NADER: Can you require them to come forward?
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Well ••.
MR. NADER: You're on the verge of a historic pronouncement, Senator.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: We take a very aggressive approach in this Committee. But to the best
of my knowledge, since Lloyd's of London does maintain an office in California, we can require their
California representative to come forward and to obtain for us the information from what I suspect
they would refer to as "home office".
MR. NADER:

I think that California is such a large market and over the years has been a
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golden hole, not a black hole, for Lloyd's of London that you should invite the Chief Executive Officer
of Lloyd's of London to come and testify as the most responsible and presumably knowledgeable
person in the organization. That's important. Otherwise, what they'll do is they'll send, they'll send
their lawyer from LeBoeuf and Lamb, a law firm in New York.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS:

I agree with you and this Committee shall do exactly, exactly that.

And Senator Davis, who is about to say something, will have the opportunity to assist them in
explaining the losses that they've suffered.
SENATOR ED DAVIS: Well, let me say, you know, we're talking nonsense-- Lloyd's of London
doesn't write insurance. They properly talked about their being a group of partners who come under
one roof now.

They're all individual little combines and are gamblers.. to go back there and say,

"We want to lay off some facts to you." And I don't think there's any way in the world that the State
of California can regulate a lot of individual partners in London. You don't have a Lloyd's of London
Insurance Company.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS:

Yes, but you have a Lloyd's of London Reinsurance Company that says

to a particular segment of the California insurance industry, the child care segment, we're going to
increase what we charge you for reinsurance so you're going to have to increase what you charge for
your insurance. And while certainly we have no ability to regulate them, we have the ability to ask
them to appear and to give them the opportunity to put their financial information out in the
spotlight of public attention.
SENATOR DAVIS:

Before you just

(inaudible)

, don't forget that an awful lot of this

reinvestment is done -- reinsurance is done -- in Berlin now and Frankfurt and other German cities.
I guess, if we're going to expand now, we're going to take over the world.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: No.
SENATOR DAVIS: You better straighten the mess out here before •.•
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS:

We're going to assist in any way that we can in getting as much

information and disclosure to the public out there of what's going on so that if Lloyd's of London is
being treated unfairly and losing all these bets, then they'll have an opportunity to explain that. If
they're winning large bets at the expense of the California insurance consumer, then they should not
be unwilling to explain what it is they bet and how much they've won.
SENATOR QUENTIN KOPP: Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Kopp.
SENATOR KOPP: Well, I know we're using some colorful metaphors here. But I want to ask •..
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: That's just because the 49ers are in town and delayed the start of my
hearing.
SENATOR KOPP: I wanted to ask Mr. Nader-- this is a situation and this is the problem which
is presented. I guess your argument is that reinsurers have a direct effect upon the price of insurance
to the consumers of California. And at the same time, Senator Robbins referred to perhaps adopting
a rule which would require primary insurers to retain at least 10 percent of coverage.

And you

suggested in one of your first remarks that indeed that is happening to a larger extent.
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I am

interested in what your recommendation would be, irrespective of whether we have long-arm
jurisdiction over Lloyd's of London or some West Germany company.
MR. NADER: You mean on this legislation?
SENATOR KOPP: Well, yeah, yeah, on the whole .•.
MR. NADER:

(Inaudible)

SENATOR KOPP:

, you mean?

Yeah, on the whole element of reducing the amount and extent of

reinsurance because that would seem to me to be another way of reaching an answer to the problem.
MR. NADER:

Yes, but that can have effects in terms of reducing the willingness of certain

companies to take on certain risks. See, the key thing is to make sure they're both solid. I think the
key thing is to make sure that the primary insurers and the reinsurers are solvent, do not engage in
arbitrary, discriminatory practice, do not engage in collusive pricing practices.
questions you want.

Those are the

But once you start getting an arbitrary percentage, you might affect the

willingness, indeed, the capacity, of the primary insurer to take on the risks and then lay them off on
the reinsurer.

There are much better ways to make sure they're both operating in a healthy,

undiscriminatory and actuarially sound manner and the way they assess the risks and underwriting
prices.
SENATOR KOPP:

Without any overriding rule by statute or otherwise that would require

primary insured to retain so much coverage?
MR. NADER: Not unless you see a real clear abuse, not unless you see a real withdrawal from
the reinsurance market in order to bring the primary companies to their knees or their customers'
(inaudible)
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: A brief question or comment and then he's going to resume.
SENATOR DAVIS:
represent the reinsurers

A very, very brief comment.
(inaudible)

I endorse trying to get somebody who can

Lloyd's to come here to tell us why

(inaudible)

what

you'd hear is a terribly distorted California court system that makes this an impossible place to
reinsure at the same rate you can reinsure in many other states and in many other countries. And so
I'm all for getting the representatives here from the reinsurers, from Lloyd's, and we'd even pay their
expenses. I think it would be worth it. We can learn something about the real problems of insurance.
The underlying problems are the terribly distorted court system in California.
MR. NADER:

Let me just

(inaudible)

Senator Davis. First of all, Lloyd's itself will admit

that by far the most lucrative market in the world for Lloyd's, year after year, has been the United
States.
Secondly, I think we have to remember that Lloyd's would prefer that our legal system goes to
the lowest British common denominator, where the juries have very little role, if any, in determining
damages where punitive damages are unknown, where there's no contingent fee opening the
courtroom door to lower economic classes, where the difficulty of getting evidence into the trial is
insuperably higher in England. They would like that. They would like a legal system where victims of
the drug Oraflex, produced by Eli Lilly in England, were just paid, after five years of litigation, in
settlement, $3,100 each, which, I might add, was less than what the Chairman of Eli Lilly makes in
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one day.

And these are horribly damaged -- their skin is falling off, elderly people, liver damage --

horrible damage widely publicized in England.

Or in this country, the same victims of Oraflex

received verdicts of $250,000 to $400,000 settlements, in that area, if not more. I'm sure Lloyd's
would love to bring our country's legal system down to their ways like medieval status in England at
the same time. And so that shouldn't be a surprise to any of us.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS:

Lloyd's will be invited to appear, be asked to expose the financial

information, and be given an opportunity to state their views. Mr. Nader.
ASSEMBLYMAN LLOYD CONNELLY:

Mr. Chairman, would you just be sure not to refer to

them as Lloyd's. Say Lloyd's of London every time. (Laughter)
MR. NADER: Well taken. I can understand your sensitivity.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Please continue.
MR. NADER: All right. Now I'd like to focus on the issue of loss prevention. If the insurance
companies are going to behave as if they're just a pass-through mechanism, what do we need
insurance companies for?

The best pass-through mechanism of insurance is Medi-Care and Social

Security. It takes about 3 cents on a dollar to deliver Medi-Care.
insurance industry is not to behave like a pass-through mechanism.

The justification for a private
It's to first and foremost be

active in loss prevention, in analyzing work place hazards and unsafe automobiles and traffic
congestion and speed limits and bumper standards and become an advocate for the kind of measures,
both in the marketplace through differential rating of differential car repair and experience, as car
safety experience, and by having public and enforceable safety standards to keep its claims down.
The best way to keep claims down and to keep the cost of the insurance companies down is to make
sure that safety and health advance in such concrete, pragmatic ways that fewer people get killed,
fewer people are injured, fewer people come down with diseases, fewer dollars are devoted to
damage.
Now look at the record. When Mr. Reagan pushed, at the request of General Motors, to be sure,
in the early 80s, to reduce the bumper standards from 5 miles per hour protective level to

2~,

the

insurance companies issued a statement saying it's going to cost hundreds of millions of dollars more
a year in these fender-bender collision expenses.

Yet, did they put the muscle on in those critical

few weeks when we were trying to save that standard, the awesome muscle of insurance agents
around the country, their executives?

No.

The standard went down to 2Yz; GM went down to

2~.

That's less than walking speed-- a bumper standard.
One or two of the companies did file a lawsuit; they didn't win but this was a lobbying effort
through Congress which they could have. Basically, they didn't do much at all. They then recognized
that going from 55 to 65 was not only going to be more fuel inefficient, but it was going to kill X
numbers of people and generate more injury. They didn't lift a finger on that except that they said
that the rates were going to go up if the standard was allowed to go to 65 miles. They had predicted
that the rates would go up.
Thirdly, let's take the pompous Fireman's Fund Company, one of my favorite examples of
insurance pompousity. Look at this: Fireman's Fund. Remember the name. Remember the name.
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In 1982., Andy McGuire of the Trauma Foundation from San Francisco, probably known to you,
he became very interested in trying to get support for the development of a fire-safe cigarette.

He

learned from the various national data-gathering safety institutes that between 1,500 and 2.,000
deaths from fire were due to fire -- were due to cigarettes -- that the cigarette was the leading
cause of fire in this country, bar none; and that of the 5,500 deaths a year, almost 2.,000 were from
cigarette-caused fires in the homes elsewhere.

He was concerned because our country has the

highest fire death fatality rate per capita of any western country, three times that of Japan.
He

also

was concerned because

indifference toward trying to reduce fire.

the

insurance

companies

had displayed a

remarkable

A scholar at Harvard accused him a number of years ago

of wanting to preserve their market -- we've got to have fires. And you sell more fire insurance and
you charge more.

Well, Mr. McGuire was not that jaded.

He went to the Chairman of Fireman's

Fund, Myron Dubane, who referred him to John Kennedy, who was then ahead of Legislative Affairs
for the Fireman Fund. And he went to John Kennedy and asked him to support Senator Cranston's bill
in Congress to push, to regulate the cigarette so it is more fire resistant. This is technically feasible.
Two tobacco companies have developed a fire-safe cigarette.

900 of these cigarettes are in cold

storage, as we speak, in the National Bureau of Standards so they don't deteriorate.

And John

Kennedy told Mr. McGuire, he said, quote, "This is of real interest to us but this is a federal issue and
we don't get involved in federal issues," end quote, a very rough but very rather accurate paraphrase.
Now the insurance companies always are sensitive to this because they want continued state,
quote, "regulation", a euphemism, and they don't want to push for any federal standards of safety
because they think other people would say, "Oh, good enough to regulate X industry federally. Why
not you?" But then Mr. McGuire said, "Well, we just happen to have a California bill in Sacramento
to achieve the same goal."

And Mr. Kennedy said, "Well, we still didn't think the company would

support it because it deals with the tobacco industry and the tobacco industry can only be dealt with
on a national scale." Nice Catch-2.2..
Here's the Fireman's Fund, huh?

Now my letter to the head of Aetna goes into so;:ne detail in

terms of the early history of loss prevention when Lloyd's of London did a very good thing in the 17th
and 18th Century, required that the ships going to the Orient to be equipped with lifeboats; they built
lighthouses.

That's loss prevention.

In the 19th Century, they did good work, the insurance

companies, on boiler safety, the rise of the Industrial Revolution, where boilers would explode and kill
workers.
But in recent decades, the insurance companies have become not engineering underwriting
institutions as much as financial institutions.

They would much rather get $1,000 of premium from

you and pay you just $500 back than get $500 in premium and pay you $2.50 back because in the first
case, they've got $500 left over to put in investment and get investment income from, which is a big
factor for them. And in the second case, all they have is $2.50. So they have become a cost-plus type
of operation, a pass-through mechanism, involving tens of billions of dollars a year.

And instead of

having this colossal vested interest supporting cancer prevention, fire prevention, worker safety, auto
safety, in a powerful, not a rhetorical way-- they'll give you the rhetoric; they'll show you the
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resolutions; they'll show you institutions like Underwriting Lab, which are very, very timid.

I'm

talking about using their muscle the way Clay Jackson uses his muscle on some of your colleagues.
Imagine Clay Jackson fighting for a fire-safe cigarette, fighting for stronger bumpers on cars to
reduce those hundreds of millions of dollars for expenses to consumers in California, pushing for
fast~r

adoption of air bags to prevent the injuries and the deaths and therefore the claims on his

client's treasury chest.

Imagine Clay Jackson, this man who towers above the Legislature in

Sacramento, who can simply come to a legislative committee and say, "Ladies and gentlemen, you
know our opposition to this legislation. Thank you." And the message is conveyed.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Should Mr. Jackson then consider this an endorsement of his product?
MR. NADER: Excuse me?
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS:

Should Mr. Jackson consider your statement an endorsement of his

product, his lobbying services?
MR. NADER: It's his endorsement of his unfulfilled power to do good. Now .••
SENATOR BILL LOCKYER:

Actually, he has a new brochure that points out that the people

have the right to petition their government and that's what he does.
MR. NADER:

Oh, yeah.

I recognize that right which he exercises day by day and night by

night. But I'm just trying to give it a qualitative redirection.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS:

I don't think Mr. Jackson, having arm wrestled with Mr. Jackson on

various tobacco legislation, I doubt that he will be pushing for development of a safe cigarette since
one of his clients happens to be the American Tobacco Institute.
MR. NADER: Well, may the cries of anguish of burned children's bodies and homes destroyed by
cigarettes ring in his nightmares. He should be ashamed of himself, but then he has other priorities.
Now I think that, I think that the insurance industry basically is taking the world as it is. That
phrase was given to me by a vice president of an insurance company in New England.

He said, you

know-- when I talked to him about loss prevention-- he said, "You know, I guess the insurance
company just takes the world as it is and then write the risks and then get the money and the pay
out." And loss prevention means you don't take the world as it is. You elbow that critical insurance
function in the direction of private and public safety and health standard.

But not only do the

insurance companies take the world as it is but they tend to blame everybody but themselves. You
would think the juries in California go berserk. You'd think the judges are reading Karl Marx on their
lunch break.

You would think that the Rand Corporation, hardly a radical organization out of

Santa Monica, which has issued study after study debunking the myth of the litigation explosion, the
runaway, crazy juries, the expansion of unreasonable imposition of punitive damages, again and again,
the Rand Corporation studies which, I might add, are partially funded by an increasingly disgruntled
insurance industry, are coming out reflecting the true data that the stability of the tort system is
remarkable in accordance with inflation and population growth.

You can always point to a crazy

verdict; you can almost always point to a judge setting it aside or throwing it out or in an appeal
court reverse it. Very few people point to the legitimate claims that go through trial and don't get a
cent because juries are pretty tough, oftentimes too tough minded or judges likewise. Those don't
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lead to any headlines in the Los Angeles Times or San Francisco Chronicle, like the brain-damaged
tremendous evidence of malpractice in a Virginia hospital, three days of trial by a
trial lawyer of great integrity who never takes a phony case or who would consider a phony case, he
zero for that infant and in Jerry Falwell's hometown, Virginia.
So we should remember that not one out of ten of malpractice cases ever gets a dollar
verdict or settlement. The total number of malpractice victims getting any money in 1986 was about

18,000 in the United States. There are easily over 400,000 serious malpractice cases a year in our
country. And the total transfer in malpractice verdicts or settlements is less than $2 billion a year
which is less than what we spend on cat food. Business Week had it right, right from the
article editorial after article editorial, exposing the myth of the runaway verdicts in the
explosion. And they said that the cause of medical malpractice crisis is malpractice.
So I would like to emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that the Committee might do well having an
information hearing of loss prevention. Let the insurance companies have their say, how they support
the National Underwriters Lab, $7 million
$30 million.

(inaudible)

due for highway safety when they can use

But let other groups have their say and let's develop a public expectation level that

begins to look at their insurance companies with the following muses.

I wonder what my insurance

company has done to get a car built in this country that's less repair prone or with bumpers that
protect against property damage, or with crash protection that will make my
secure and crashes that now take lives and limbs.

That kind of expectation level will be the

~nost

fundamental restructuring reform of the insurance industry, in addition with the more day-to-day
provisions implicit in Proposition 103. A lot of other points that I made .•.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS:

I don't want you to think that this Committee is quick to respond to

suggestions but I just had the sergeant give you a piece of legislation that's scheduled for introduction
tomorrow that would require any insurance company that makes an application for a rate increase
under Prop. 103 to include within it its Risk Reduction Program and to-- it also requires the
information on the Risk Reduction Program be contained with each insurance policy issue. So either
we were thinking along the same line or else my staff has acted remarkably fast in taking -MR. NADER: I wasn't aware of •••
CHAIRMAN

ROBBINS:

--

taking your suggestion and getting it ready for legislative

introduction tomorrow which is the bill introduction deadline here in the Senate.
MR. NADER: I'm very pleased by that. But I do want -- without seeming ingracious, I do want
to end by noting page 9 and 10 of my testimony which lists some of the bills which have gotten
through in this Legislature with very little publicity, chipping away the personal injury rights of
victims. And I think that when you see this occurring, you see that this ship of state that we call the
safety rights of injured and sick people to have their day in court is being perforated with holes in the
in one way after another with bills that don't command great public attention and are propelled
through the Legislature and signed by Governor Deukmejian.
For example, what possible justification could there be for a bill that immunizes municipalities
for injuries to third parties caused by police pursuits? That's when the police take off on very little
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pretext.

A Syracuse police chief once told me, he said, "Some of our boys are like teenagers two

years removed." You know, they're not seeing a felony, someone
a bank.

out with smoking guns from

They just suspect something; they take off; the chase car becomes a missle, crashes into

another car at a red light. That car, which may have a family of four -- an actual case in California
-- Washington suburb-- under this law, could not have sued the municipality that the police worked
for.

The same is -- things like eliminating both strict liabilities for injuries caused by prescription

drugs meeting FDA approval.

The FDA is notoriously weak and behind the times in terms of their

drug standard. And this one was particularly interesting to me on a police dog. Let me see if I can
find it. A police dog, a bite by a police dog.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS:

Be very careful about what you say about the police with Chief Davis

seated to ..•
MR. NADER: I know.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: To my left.
MR. NADER:

I know.

What he knows, he knows as a police chief, that some of the officers

behind the wheel sometimes get carried away with themselves.

And there are always police

department guidelines on hot pursuits.
Look at this one, "immunizes municipalities from liability for acts of police dogs." That's what
I mean by chipping away.

"

immunity for negligence of volunteer directors of nonprofit

corporations and medical trade associations", "limit punitive damage claims against religious
corporations."
someone?

Well, what if they have a truck that's driven by a guy under the influence and kills

Do you say to the mother of the dead child, "Sorry, it was a religious institution that

owned that truck"?
SENATOR LOCKYER: If I may, Mr. Chairman, one of the problems with the way that the list
has been summarized, Mr. Nader and others, is that it tends to miss some of the subtleties.

For

example, just to give you one example, the most, the last bill you mentioned was that by
Senator Doolittle on religious organizations. The debate, which was a rather serious one, involved an
assertion of First Amendment Constitutional claims that were being burdened by tort system factors.
Now that's -- people might decide those in different ways but at least it was a serious discussion
about important matters. The result was to require a pleading hurdle. It doesn't grant an immunity.
It simply says before you can bring a punitive damage claim against the religious organization, you

should show the court that there is some reasonable basis for punitive damages, not as we have often
been told, sort of legal harassment which terrorizes people because they can't insure against
punitives. So the bill in fact is much more, much less, restrictive of a right to recover than perhaps
the brief description or summary of it in the list.

So, you know, I could do that with each one of

the -- I wouldn't to take a lot of time to do it.
MR. NADER: I know.
SENATOR LOCKYER: To make that general point.
MR. NADER: You see, it's all in the direction of making it more difficult.
SENATOR LOCKYER: Of course.
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MR. NADER: Like let me

which you could make a case.

SENATOR LOCKYER: Yes.
MR. NADER: It provides im
argument

to restaurants donating food to a nonprofit food bank. The

you
food bank.

careful. If

are

not

a.'1.y money on this.

But we all know that the prospect of liability tends to make

u.u•uc•uu~=>

the food to a

food

good for business

P.R.

be

And what if

become negligent in this area?

here if we donate the food.

worry about the fact that it

be a little

SENATOR LOCKYER:

understand.

MR. NADER:

it becomes more and more. Am I correct ...

SENATOR LOCKYER:

I

the

frankly, was to address this current

now the insurance industries have suffered.
you know, some think

other

with a, I think, extensive list and not one which I

these cases, a much

these

you

forward

but saying here are the
some

social purpose.

ask you to comment if you would. As I recall

and

the average

the last time these

in California in a personal
were obtained.

resolutions is almost to

The

seems

all the time for ways to
that that may entail some

action is about $9,200, at least
costs associated with those disputed

a transactional cost

hard to defend.

and economize with

resources, understanding

of what would be viewed as a

resources. And most of these really were

know what other ways there are.

So

a cause of action but

trying to do more dispute resolution with less and less resources as every

I

stake, the

immunities, constraints -- and thinking it's a

matter -- but

of fewer and

But the

would be that which we voted down. But at least in

we have

these

all that's

business and so I

cases in which we have balanced individual recovery
least

have Prop. 103.

it as the lawyers versus, and

made any concessions o:r ~··~·"'~·~ in the way

other side

So it's chipping,

it may not seem much per bill.

And while

discussion which

more

getting the P.R., you know,

That cream in

chipping,

And

giving their food to a

institution feels the

ected to those kinds of tests.

We've tried to talk about arbitration or a neighborhood

dispute, resolution centers, or alternatives that would perhaps be less expensive. But when the public
it

costs are the equivalent of that which the victim gets in these

seems to be a

burden.
MR. NADER: But my experience in the way these little bills get through around the country at
the state

level is that

arouse a
e states now have been

usually
And

through because

have one

extremely narrow.

anecdote behind

a bill which makes it very

They

two little anecdotes.
to sue a physician for

if the physician is treating an indigent patient without the prospect of payment directly.

That's a terrible ...
SENATOR LOCKYER:

having the same dispute in this •..
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because

poor, you

so-and-so
consistent

of evidence

has to be maintained

a

one

on
to be as

that

of many cases
ake these
If

statement or

me
of our California trial
around
Jackson and the

for
that
And so how can you
didn't do that

criticize

I'm sorry I

c
of U."'liform

SENATOR

on?

this group.
wrote
Insurance Commissioner to set

to encourage
standards to address loss

citizen groups, and the
103

Com
and
in

of

formal
we think

Court for the
commitment
effect.

voters

reform and :received it.

- 1

any insurance company be

as

bet you a

even up,

is:

it

what

what

ln

up the pros and

the

of courts and
court.
ask you one other
I want to take

up

the one-dollar
LOCKYER: I'm the stake holder? Oh-oh.
Chief Davis is gone.

a
ROBBINS:

may not bet on this but I'm

LOCKYER: Both of these Senators can afford the stakes too.
Let

e ask you, let me ask you this.

I was

ask

familiar
formulated

I'm
recovery for

the no-fault law
and

a

and it turns huma.'1

of reasons.
into chattels

so

And

company, Mr. Rosenfield, does not fall within Farmers and
is that neither you nor Mr. N ade:r would have any

and

ection -- if you

want to hear it -- that they be exempt because they write only for these people, be exempt from
. Is my information correct or my information is
ROSENFIELD: You

mean

DEDDEH:

from the rate control

not rate

but to do whatever

write insurance to you and to me.
members of the

of 103

and

write to

of the company.

MR. ROSENFIELD: I think I understand what your

Senator.

in

To everybody.
MR. ROSENFIELD: -- to everybody. Because of the nature of the

and

attention that this issue has been paid, if you want to discuss this with us, we'd be

to

it.

SENATOR DEDDEH: I would like to do that because I do have plans to introduce a
them from the

of 103, for their rates and so, but to have them, that exclusive

whatever

j

to write only, and only to these

MR. ROSENFIELD:

to discuss with you our intention.

CHAIRMAN ROBBINS:

the way, you can solve the USAA

creates their

is the cross

Act that says you

103.

not

not

without

of the Rosenthal-Robbins

Insurance

discriminate on occupation when that's interfaced with

You can do it by

the Rosenthal-Robbins Act to deal with your definition of

to allow a military company, to •••
DEDDEH: Mr. Chairman, is that your SB 103?
that is not SB 103.

ROBBINS:
when

with

a bill that we

several years

103, creates the problem but you can solve their

an amendment to that act :rather than making an amendment to Prop. 103.
If an amendment to that particular

SENATOR DEDDEH:
the

were

they will be back in

to 103?

CHAIRMAN ROBBINS:

Without touching 103.

103 doesn't create their

the

combination of the two that does.
SENATOR DEDDEH:

like to help resolve that problem but I do not know how to do t.

CHAIRMAN ROBBINS:
SENATOR DEDDEH:

get you •••
I don't want to offend anybody's, any of the witnesses any more than I

offend the Chair. So I would like to work with the Chair and Mr.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS:

not offended; I'm not offended. We'll

ATOR DEDDEH: All

the

Great, great.

CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Lockyer, and then .••
SENATOR LOCKYER:

I guess a similar inquiry as to a related form of insurance that was

excluded from 103 but many of us are concerned about is worker compensation.
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Now~

a different bundle of issues and I could understand why you drew the line you did. But
and in

a form of insurance that is highly profitable, from all we could

noncompetitive, that is, the State sets the price and that's what you have to pay. And then
for insurance

you may get a rebate. It seems like a circumstance very

would benefit workers and business people. I don't know if you're contemplating any additionai
in that area or if you have thoughts about it. If there are

om~s,

I'd appreciate

MR. ROSENFIELD: Senator, my understanding is that there are others who are
an initiative.
SENATOR LOCKYER: Okay.
MR. ROSENFIELD: Right now, most of our -- all of our resources •..
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: He just wants to make sure you don't have idle time on your hands
results in your being forced to .•.
SENATOR LOCKYER:

Mr. Chairman, if I may, one other

and

guess we can

of share prospectives on this and perhaps that's the most I can do. For those of us
our ob is to act as a social glue in a very plural and diverse
Nader mentioned, specifically, SB 241, with that whole list of bills that we have
of

away at the tort system, that was supported by trial
on the belief that the business and medical com

was about to

ways that would result in very, very extreme rollbacks, cuts in tort recovery
And so it was kind of a tactful choice and it's a difficult one and it's one I, you know, raise for any
comments you may make, of whether it is better to just maintain the pure position, ru"'ld I could
understand

advocates setting those kind of standards. But for those in

who

sort of mediative responsibility, whether we should stay pure and fight, at least at the time the
belief that we were outgunned so much, we would lose; or whether we should make some modest
accommodation where they seem reasonable in order to postpone that fight.
obviousiy, the same issues in the 103, 104 context, they had a lot of fire power and you
won.

I'm not sure that same thing would have happened with respect to victims' rights rather than

more direct, economic benefit that a consumer would feel with their personal auto insurance. If
could comment on that.
MR. NADER: I have two comments. I always thought that they would never have had to reach
the napkin in the restaurant stage, had in the spring.

They had put forth a credible initiative of

The insurance industry put forth a credible initiative threat. The trial lawyers did not
forth the prospect of the credible initiative. Therefore, they got themselves cornered by the

SENATOR LOCKYER: In terms of the tactical situation.
MR. NADER: Yeah.
SENATOR LOCKYER: Yeah.
MR. NADER:

Secondly-- yeah, that's what I wanted to say about that.
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What was the other

LOCKYER:

how those assessments in what worker comp. --

assessments.
NADER:

I was

to say, that in

there was an initiative last November

for a lifetime to $100,000.

And the doctors and the

or $15 million and they lost, quite decisive. So there was ...
SENATOR LOCKYER: How much was spent on the other side?
About $10

So there was a tort reform issue.

LOCKYER: True
NADER: Yeah. There was a tort reform •••
LOCKYER: Sounds like a lot of money on both sides.
there was.
SENATOR LOCKYER: But at least that side ...
I mean it was
SENATOR LOCKYER: So
The trial
SENATOR LOCKYER:
NADER: And the medical association. And all the newspapers came in on the side of the
newspapers -- Orlando
doctor on a radio talk show.
and

Miami Herald. It was very

And I

you want to limit a person

and many doctors in Florida make that much
" I mean it's really an incredible -- it's

who deal with pain every day, doctors, can

three

how
like that on

LOCKYER: Thank you.
ROBBINS:

As we approach the end of our hearing, what I'd like to do is

asked any

I'll give, if he wishes the opportunity to ask one ••.

TOM HAYDEN: Just a very brief one.
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: And then
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:

have a brief comment.

I agree with you that we should be working on 103 and not on

alternatives. But what's being floated here by many is the New York version of no-fault. I'd
to

like

you an opportunity to discuss the New York pricing.
MR. NADER: I

just say that the New York version passed about 50 years ago.

And it

with no-fault for very small cases, so it isn't the kind of verbal threshold that so:ne no-fault
like initiative versions.

I

think New York teaches this very much about no-

CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Kopp has a 15-second question to ask.
MR. NADER: Sure.
SENATO

KOPP: Did you get an answer to this letter to Jim Lynn?
- 20-

MR. NADER:

Yes.

As a matter of fact-- I didn't get it from Jim
general counsel. I did want to bring it

Middlebrook (?)

but

I

from

send you a copy.

SENATOR KOPP: I'd like to see it.
MR. NADER: And if I may characterize it, basically, they say the real problems are auto
runaway juries. We've always been in favor of safe ...
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Let me, on that note, let me say that it has been very
taken the time to appear at the Committee today.
them were

You've answered all of the

that warmed the seat a little bit that you were

you for that.
I believe, takes very, very

Let me say that the
103.

the

the will of the people and it gives the Legislature a

prayer that the Legislature will rise to the challenge. There
so

to
and it is my
little excuse not to

for those who may wish to curry favor with the special interests.
one last comment, which

alifornia and we do.

I sat in on the hearing before the

alifornia
insurance.

you commented we have a business-oriented court

insurance.

The guy who has a

The guy who

as
a shoe

did.
store

business has to carry insurance in his truck.

has to carry insurance on its fleet of vehicles.
the business

of California has as

Every small

The

businessman in California carries
a stake in the insurance

down the costs of insurance in California as the individual who will never
because he doesn't even have enough money to
ent.

for business in California, with the possible exception of one list of
and

to overrule Proposition 103. Thank you for
MR. NADER: Thank you for the invitation.

--oOo--
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any

a house and he lives in

And it's my opinion that that business-oriented court will uphold

dominated by out-of-state

to carry

with us
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Just

of

operations.l In recent years, insurers have used their control of the
liability insurance marketplace as a weapon of involuntary servitude,
enlisting businesses, medical professionals and manufacturers in an
alliance to undermine the integrity of the courts and the rights of
consumers.
We now know, of course, that restrictions on the legal rights of
consumers and victims to full compensation by wrongdoers, have virtually
llQ impact upon insurance rates. Dozens of tort law restrictions since
1986 in California have had no impact on rates -- yet today the
insurance companies, anxious to avoid the impact of Proposition 103's
rate cuts, demand that consumers surrender even more of their basic
civil law rights!
Consider some examples of the wholesale legislative retreat from
California's once nationally-respected panoply of victims' civil law
rights and remedies,
drawn from a summary prepared by Senate Judiciary
Committee Chair Bill Lockyer:
• Proposition 51 -- This June 1986 ballot measure promoted by the
surance industry, the medical and manufacturers lobbies promised an
immediate 15% savings in insurance by restricting non-economic damages
in joint and several liability cases.
1988 Statutes
• SB 1 (Doolittle) -- limits punitive damage claims against
religious corporations.
• SB 1978 (Lockyer) -- permits post-litigation inquiry into
veracity of certificate of merit of architects and engineers.
• SB 1755 (Lockyer) --provides immunity for negligence of
volunteer directors and officers of non-profit corporations and medical
trade associations if sufficient insurance coverage is in effect.
• SB 2333 (Kopp) -- provides immunity for schools from strict
liability for asbestos exposure.
• SB 2427 (Rogers) -- provides immunity to restaurants donating
food to non-profit food banks.
• SB 2789 (Maddy) -- limits liability of lending institutions for
large loans.
• AB 2973 (O'Connell)
for acts of police dogs.
• AB 3224 (N. Waters)

immunizes public entities from liability
immunizes farmers from liability for

1

One powerful sector of the insurance industry which has received little attention
is the reinsurance system. The legislature should conduct an investigation of Lloyds
and other reinsurers in order to bring them under proper regulatory and disclosure
requirements. This will prevent actions by reinsurers which contribute to the
destabilization of the insurance marketplace in California.
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j

s caused by dangerous conditions to persons invited on the farm
produce
charitable purposes.
• AB 3473
lante) -- immunizes a physician from liability for
etrical
ligence when "on call."
• AB 3694 (Harris) -- expands public entity immunity for land
lures.
AB 3

(Frazee) -- expands immunity of local elected officials.

• SB 23 (Bergeson) -- overturns state supreme court case
ch
liability of
lie entities which provided safety services on
• SB 241 (Lockyer) -- the statutory embodiment of the infamous
"nonaggression pact" between various trade associations, this law
ishes tougher procedural hurdles for punitive damages awards,
s product liability actions against tobacco, alcohol and butter
r
s,
limits the obligation of insurance companies to
independent counsel to insureds.
~ SB 1526 (Lockyer) -- qualified immunity provided to volunteer
irectors and some off
rs
non-profits if insurance secured or
ffort made to secure insurance.

• SB 1598 (Presley) -- provides that a violation of governmental
manual or rule book does not create presumption of negligence unless the
rule was formal
adopted as a regulation or statute.
and

• AB 1530
. Brown) -- permits corporations to immunize directors
f
from 1
lity to the corporation for their negligence.
• AB 19

( irling -- immunizes public entities for injuries to
s caused by police pursuits.

In addition to these legislative infringements upon tort laws, a
of recent court decisions have further limited tort laws:
Foley y, Interactive Data Corp.
ful termination.

(1988) -- eliminated tort remedies

Moradi - Shalal v. Fireman's Fund (1988) -- abolished bad faith
rty party actions against insurers.
Brown y, Superior Court (1988)
eliminated most strict liability
injuries caused by prescription drugs.

s immodest list of legislative and judicial restrictions upon
common law tort rights and remedies -- some centuries old -- has
consumers and victims of important legal protections. Insurance
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However,

slators should follow the lead of the public,
the elect
resu s last November, and refuse to surrender
economic pressure and propaganda of the industry. The array of
ctions on victims' rights recently approved by the legislature
ld
led; an appropriate place to begin is SB 241, a measure
had failed before the ink on the Governor's signature was
r appropriate candidate for immediate repeal is MICRA,
ch
rteen years since its passage has deprived many victims of
ctice of legal representation and full compensation for
consider whether Prop 103's
ication
s Act and other consumer protection laws
su
c
remedies to those victimized by the bad faith of
surance companies, or whether other legislation is necessary in light
Royal Globe decision.
1 , proposals wh
call for further sacrifices of the
California c izens should be rejected; there are many
e measures which the industry can adopt -- without
s
11 cut costs, improve safety and reduce
surance rates.

Loss

Prevention

Insurance
s are
indifferent to sa
because they have become predominantly cash
The
profit is based on a percentage of their projected
so the higher the cost, the greater the absolute dollar profit.
more attention is paid to increasing investment income through
volume.
Less attention is paid to safety and engineering
ions that cou
reduce premiums but retain prudent underwriting
Insurance
s would much rather charge a premium of
and then pay out $500 in claims, then charge $500 and pay $250,
they would prefer having more money to put in investments and to
financial objectives.
this system, insurance companies lack incentive to reduce
costs through better health and safety conditions. As a
, even repeated litigation arising from well-known and identical
z rdous products or services has not prompted the insurance industry
ist
hazards be eliminated. And with very few exceptions,
have failed to exert their legendary political muscle in state
is
res and in. Congress, or advocate before regulatory agencies, to
enact or maintain proven life-saving programs like the 55 mph speed
1
, airbags, and the 5 mph bumper protection standard (the latter
been reduced to an absurd 2 1/2 mph collision protection level
bill
s of dollars). Our 1987 survey of eleven major U.S.
casualty company foundations showed that casualty prevent
is
much
a priority for grants and other contributions.
Trave
contributed $10,000 to safety programs. Aetna, American
Corporation, Chubb, Continental, and Farmers Insurance Group
$5,000 or less.
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We have challenged the insurance industry to disavow the assault
on the civil justice system, and instead join with us in fighting for
tougher loss prevention practices that would cut claims costs by
reducing the source of claims -- preventable deaths and injuries.
Attached you will find a letter to the Chairman of Aetna Life and
Casualty, suggesting in detail a program of loss prevention that would
dramatically reduce payouts and protect workers and consumers. To date,
no insurer has made the necessary commitment to loss prevention.
Conclusion

The Prop. 103 victory is reverberating throughout the nation with
the message that insurance consumers will be standipg up for their
rights against unreasonable insurance rates, arbitrary practices and
lobbying pressure by insurance companies and their corporate allies to
take away victims' rights. Californians can be proud that their
pioneering vote last November has given strength and direction to
millions of consumers across the country.
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January 26, l989
James P. Lynn, Chairman
Aetna Life and Casualty Company
151 Farmington Avenue
Hartford, CT 06156
Dear t-:r. Lynn:
I a~ writing to you about how Aetna car. reduce costs -especia:ly thro~gh loss prevention -- instead of continuing its
three decade drive to take away injured peoples' legal rights in
courts of law.
·
!n9~rance co~Fanies say that Californians should be denied
their right to receive Proposition 103's rate relief and
insura~ce industry reform because, they say, Prop. 103 will cost
them money. They say that the one-year 20 percent rate reduction
ordered by Prop. 103 is unfair and unreasonable since auto
insurance rates are already too low, and because "costs," i.e.
leqal fees, medical bills and car-repair expenses, are rising.
"The cost !ncreases have outpaced our ability to manage
efficiently, so we have to charge more,h Safeco's president told
the H.al.l Street JournaJ,.
Rather than looking at their own waste, inefficiency,
rnis~a~agement and inattention to loss prevention for the solution
to controlling costs, insurers have spent many millions of
dollars ca~paigning not only to defeat proposed reforms of the
insurance industry, but to restrict the rights of victims to sue
the pe=petrators of their harm and obtain fair co~pensation for
injuries.
Proposition l03's enactment, notwithstanding the industry's
mu~ti-million dollar campaign to defeat it, has mobilized
citizens nationwide to fight for strengthened regulation and
increased competition for the insurance industry. Therefore,
co~panies will have to look for ways to reduce their costs,
specifically throush more efficient operation, and more effective
advocacy for health and safety to prevent injuries and property
da~aqe from occurring.

1.

E!fici.e.nc~

The insurance industry represents one of the greatest
bundles of capital ever brought together in world history.
Property/casualty companies in the United States have assets
tota~ling over $300 billion; and over 2,000 life insurance
companies have assets totalling over $900 billion. This huge
industry, however, is an inefficient and wasteful bureaucracy.
If insurance companies operated more efficiently, they could
easily reduce rates.
For example, in the private passenger automobile liability
line, the industry overall pays 35.3 percent of what it writes in
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loss adjustment and underwriting expenses, including claims
processing, de!ense fees, commissions and brokers. Yet USAA, one
of the best service companies in the ~arket, operates at only a
20 percent expense level. According to the National Insurance
Consu~er Organization, auto liability ins~rance rates would drop
by an average of 19 percent nationally i ! the industry on average
were as efficient as USAA.
Ir.surance compa~ies have operated so inefficiently in
California and elsewhere because the insurance market is, in
importa~t ways, not corr.petitive.
Insurers engage in price-fixing
because such practices are not subject to antitrust laws. In
addition, states have anti-rebate laws which prohibit insurance
agents froM offering discounts to policyholders. As a result,
the most efficient agent can not compete for market share by
offering a discount. Also, many state laws prohibit group auto
and homeowner insurance sales which could enhance buyer
bargaining power. And consumers do not have access to good,
comparative information about prices and services.
Proposition 103 repeals ~he antitrust exemption, the
rebate and the group sales prohibition in California and allows
banks t: sell liability insurance. Prop. 103 also provides for a
computerized co~su~er information system to facilitate comparison
shopping. These neasures should provide much needed incentive to
insurers to reduce costs caused by waste and inefficiency.
In addition, insurers could be doing much more than simply
complaining about legal, medical and auto repair expenses which
they say are drivir.g up their costs. For example, insurance
compa~ies often insist that information they provide plaintiffs
d~ring the discovery process in product liability cases be kept
completely confidential. This not only keeps important safety
inforrr.ation that can lead to hazard alerts and policies, from
consumers and public agencies, but also it forces plaintiffs to
start from scratch the discovery process in each similar case,
driving up both plaintiff and defense legal fees.
As for medical costs, health insurers like Aetna could be
aggressively pushing for strict guidelines to reduce physician's
misuse of unnecessary medical tests, like chest X-rays and
electrocardiograms, as well as unnecessary surgery, which add
billions to health care costs in this country. Former HEW
Secretary Joe Califano recently observed in the M~H York times
Magazipe that Americans are four times more likely to have
coronary bypass surgery than Western Europeans with the same
symptoms, ar.d that at least half of the 900,000 Caes~rean
sections performed in 1986 were unnecessary.
Insurance rates have risen out of all proportion to auto
repair costs, according to the National Insura~ce Consumer
Organization. Even so, however, insurers could be doing much
more to encourage automobile design changes which would reduce
repair costs without sacrificing safety, and reduce auto theft,
which is responsible for the largest component of comprehensive
insurance costs. I recently received a letter from a Houston
inventor who has developed a patentable computer key system which
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j
cial
, ~he contact insurance
companies
system is in fighting cla
and
essentially
fending hazards. A few lu~inous exceptions have
occur
such as
State Farm successfully
itioned the
C.S. Court of
a!s to reverse NHTSA's 1981 rescission of the
autoMatic restrB nt standards 1 or when State
and Allst
lle.
2 1/2 mph bumper protection st
even
II
has only occasionally petitioned for auto recalls and
even more rarely for new or stronger motor vehicle safety

•

demonstrate
loss

le attention
pay
ion, consider
in
e laws.
ween 1966 and 1973, almost every
a motorcycle helmet use law.
by 1980, 29
s~ates ha
al
or weakened their law and ir.surance companies
did virtually nothing to stop them. More than 500 excess deaths
many more serious injuries occur yearly in those states with
~o
cr weak helrne~ laws, compared to states with strong :aws. A
ot r ex
es serve o demonstrate what opportun ies
ins~rance corr.panies have to reduce cla
and there re co s
insisti
on
reduction or elimination of
z

a.
ss
closely
on fede
to
y to raise
the 36 states that have upped the
se highways
reads
past
r, dea~hs on
times as
increa
19 percent -- an increase nearly
in states that kept the 55 mph l
surance i
stry must share the blame
ccsts resu ing from this predi able
injuries. Althou9h the I!HS and some companies
some suppo
efforts to try to preserve the 55 mph speed
1
, had the industry devoted its full polit
1 muscle to this
issue, there is little doubt the industry could have prevailed on
ss to preserve this proven highway safety measure. And now
that
im facts about increased deaths and injuries are in,
are insurance companies not fighting to lower
ghway speeds
at
sta~e level, or to ensure the 55 mph speed limit is
maintained in sta:es which have not raised it?

bags:

The air bag can save at least 12,000 lives and
of thousands of serious injuries a year in this country.
So~e major auto insurers are providing some financial incentives
to encourage purchases of cars equipped with air bags {although
I!
says the major AAA and other motor club insurers provide
ive unless required to do eo by law as in New York
I!HS says USAA's incentive program is exceptional
unusually 1
scounts for
cal
1
ection
cars equipped with air bags (60 percent,

ter to James P.

, Page 6.

as most companies' discounts range from 20-3C percent
r
rr,edical and personal injury protection}. During 1988, USAA also
ovi d $300 to
policyholder who bought or leased a car
d with an optiona: air bag (although
the bonus to
- , the air bag must have been 09tion~, and even this bonus
s
scontinued in 1989).
if ~11 insurers put their muscle behind air bags by
co~raging air
retro-fitting, equipping their own entire
y fleets w
air
as has Travelers Insurance Co.,
r mandate
re
ations for air bags or their
i a_ents 1
more lives cou
be saved and billions of
dollars more cou_
saved annually in health costs, wage loss
s il y
whe~e

Seatbelts: !~~ National Highway Transporta~ior. Safety
Adninistration {N.HTSA) conservatively estimated that in 1987,
"
25 percentage point rise in national belt use over 1984
levels saved about 1,300 lives and preven~ed about 16,000
moder e-tc-serious injuries. The resu ant reduction in
aut
ile insurance clai~s was roughly $1 billion to $2.5
llion. Other p~blic and private insurers probably saved
another $0.5 b!llion ~o $1.25 billion.H
while seatbelt use in auto~obiles has reduced deaths~
seric~s injuries and insurance costs, it is not used to reduce
. Also, these benefits have not been extended to workers
mu9t drive dangerous vehicles on the job.
For examplet
accc
to a 1987 Tri~l ~agazine article, at least 100 forklift
operators are killed or seriously injured each year as they are
thro~,o,·r~ out 1 or jump out of forklifts that accidentally tip over.
~any tests have de~onstrated the effectiveness of seat belt use
reventing these injuries, and although a few companies like
Clar Eq~iprrent Co. and U.S. Steel require that seat belts be
installed on forklifts, most insurance companies have not
insi ed on this condition.
Jam~s W. Srr.irles, national broker liaison with the Long
Grove, 111.-based Kemper Group, told a risk managers' conference
this year that in the worker compensation area, tr.e difference
between a very good and a very bad safety record can cause them
to raise premiums as much as 400 percent. Wouldn't workers be
bet r off if insurers simply insisted that for continued
coverage, employers provide safety protections so that their
workers are protected from such accidents so that injuries and
insurance claims can be reduced?
5 mph bumper standard: Between 1978 and 1982, the government
required a. 5 rr~ph bumper protection standard, which the Carter
nistration's Department of Transportation estimated would
save consumers over $400 million a year. Despite overwhelming
consumer support for this standard, the Reagan administration,
a er heavy lobbying by General Motors, rolled the bumper
ection standard back to 2 1/2 mph.
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While fender-bender accidents represent a large se;ment of
ins-.;rance compar.y costs, ins'.lrance companies, with a few
exceptions like Allstate and State Farm, paid very little
attention to th:s development. !n addition to applying its
lobbyin~ muscle in Congress, if net before the DOT to have
prevented the rol!back of bu~per protection standards, insurers
could have petit!c~ed the govern~ent to reinstate the standard
once data on the 2 1/2 mph s~ar.dard's iwpact carne in. They did
no~.
Xoreover, insurers have not insisted on bumper standards
for lig~: trucks and vans, which now co~prise about l/3 of all
new vehicles sales.
b.

fir~

and Ele.c;,r!):al Safety.

Deaths and inj~ries due to fire are largely preventable. In
Ja;;ar:, for example, the rate of fire deaths is half that o:f the
United States-- 25.7 per ~illion in the United States; 12.5 per
millie~ ir. :apar..
7te insurance industry frequently points to its past help in
orig:~ating the natio~al electrical code and establishing
U~derwriters' Laboratories and the National Fire Protectio~
Association as examples of its past commitrr.ent to loss prevention
and flre safety. Yet these efforts are small compared to what
the i~dustry sto~ld be doing now to make these institutions real
changeMagents rather than indentured servants.
First, the industry-backed Underwriters' Laboratories' seal
of approval on ele~trical devices does not always ensure the
p~oduct's design safety.
For example, after an alarming increase
in reside~tial fires due to kerosene heater use, UL recently
upgraded its kerosene he~ter standard, UL 647, to help reduce
some of the fire deaths and injuries. However, the compromise
sta~derd failed to address some problems, such as flare-ups and
afterburn. See, fer exa~ple, the analysis in the 1988 report by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency/U.S. Fire A~inistration,
"Alternative Heater Fires:·A Critical Review of Safety Issues."
Moreover, after UL 6'7 was upgraded, retailers were still
permitted to sell out existing stocks of substandard heaters.
Sirr.ilarly, in a Novet.1ber, 1987, New Ys:itls Times. column, the
president of a mailorder horne appliance company expressed outrage
that uL's new standard to prevent electrocution from sccidental
irr~ersion of hair dryers in water, applie~ only to hair dryers
manufactured after October 1, 1987. Retailers were permitted to
sell out their steak of substandard hair dryers. As a result,
during the 1987 Christmas buying season, new and old dryers were
on the shelves, both with UL labels, and consumers could not tell
which were substandard.
Moreover, insura~ce companies have not actively promoted the
fire-safe cigarette, nor advocated strongly for residential
sprir.klers. They recently have pushed for tougher criminal laws
for arsonists, and have assisted efforts to help catch arsonists
with the Insurance Committee for Arson Control and the Insurance
Crime Prevention I~stitute. But David Hemenway, an economist at

.ttl
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the Harvard School of Public Health and a Pew Fellow in Injury
Con:~ol who has studied insurance indus~ry efforts to promote
residential fire safety, has written that the site Qf thesa
gf!o&Z$ is m!~sc~l~ co~pared to tbe size of the insurance
i;Jd·Jat.x.:i.~ng, the maa.n.i.t~e of the fire pro~l,rr..
'It:.is is an
i~ortant observaticn.
The insurance ind~stry, when it goes
beyond mere rhetoric, rarely puts more than a tiny fraction of
its tes~~tcas and power beyond public and private safety, health
ana property darrage prevention efforts. But Ae~na and other
co~panias are kno~n to lobby very vigoro~sly against victims'
rights or repeal of t~e McCarran-Ferquson Act.
Insurers have released very little useful statistical fire
data to those responsible for ensuring safety, or to
po:icy~olders.
Nor do insu~ers operationally cooperate with
ongoing corr.mun:it~' efforts at fire pr·evention. For exarr.ple, or.e
well-known anti-arson group undertook a program to prevent many
ot the most notorious p:r:operties in New York City from getting
fire insurance. Accc~ding to a 1985 article in ~itizen
&:.a;;,tj.-::.~a:.1.wn. mag~zine, the gro'.lp wrote to every insurance
corrpany known to provide fire insurance in its area, offering to
sha!"e wi":h those cornpa.r.ies some of its own credible "earlywarning" data as en aid in evaluating insurance r!sks. Wi~h the
no~able exception of the Liberty M~tual insurance company, the
group's letters and phone calls drew what it termed an
"unenthusiastic response." According to the article, other
gro~ps which also offered to work with insurers reported
sim!larly disappointing results, "raising suspicions that some
i:'lsurance compa:1ies don't much care about inner-ci t.y arson, so
long as the premiums keep rolling in to cover it."
In addition to exchanging information and mere strongly
advocating !ire safety measures, Hemenway suggests that insurers
should o:fer policyholder discounts to enco~rage fire prevention.
For example, only in the past few years have residential insurers
includ~d discounts for s~oke detectors and for net smoking, and
these discounts have neither been large nor well-pu~licized.
Such discounts should be expanded to include use of less
dangerous wiring and heating systems and !or non-flammable
furnishings.
c. Products:

It is estimated that nearly 100,000 deaths and millions of
injuries each year are product-related, and are occurring at
increasing rates. There are many ways insurance companies can
function to control and minimize these hazards which cause death
and injury.
For example, by implementing a structured disclosure
program, insurance companies can do a great deal to assist those
responsible for ffiaking products or services safer. According to
safety research cons~ltant David v. MacCollum, former president
of the American Society of Safety Engineers, insurance companies
should be collecting daea on equipment, identifying injuries by
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particular hazards, and maintaining a central data bank on hazard
information, narratives of occurrences and available safeguards.
For each claim or disputed injury, insurance companies should be
routinely identifying the product hazard or unsafe condition
which resulted in the claim, including the make and model of any
produc~ that se:ved as the host for the hazard, or any chemical
that could cause toxic injury. Companies should publish annual
su~maries of all death or injury-related occurrences, assuring
public access to this information. These data are crucial for
regulatory agencies, for those injured by such products, and for
the popu:ace so they may be alerted to unsafe products and
conditions.
Ir.terna:ly, insurance compan~es with mul~iple lines, like
wor~e~s' corrpensation and product liability, shou:d forward
infcrrr.a: :.on rego.rding hazards and equipme!lt fror.t one line to
another. In addition, information abo~t hazardo~s cond!tions and
products and those which repeatedly cause serious harm should be
CO:':'t;i':l.lr.ica:ed to law enforcement officials, as well as advertised
to t.he public.
I~surance coMpanies should also require implementation of
hazard prevention measures as part of the insurance contract,
particularly after a claim is submitted and specific hazard
prevention measures identified. Af:er a legitimate claim is
paid, the insurer should routinely conduct a hazard analysis of
the produ=t or unsafe circums~ance.
The i~surance industry's lack of concern in controlling even
the rr.cst serious hazards that the industry insures, was clearly
evident during the House Subco~~ittee on Surface Transportation
of the Comn1.:ttee on Public Wo:rl<.s and Transportation hearings, May
19, 1968, on the transportation of hazardous materials. There
are 500,000 shipments of hazardo~s and toxic materials moved each
day thrcugh1 what Rep. Douglas li.pplegate called "an archaic
hazardous materials transportation system." DOT reported
incidents of hazardous spills in 1986 were 5,700, and the Office
of Technology Assessment says that as many as 50 percent of
incidents are not reported.
Twenty-five witnesses testified at this hearing, including
ger.~rators or hazardous wastes (e.g., the chemical manufacturers
and corporations like DuPont)/ transporters of haza~dous wastes
(e.g., truckers, shippers); emergency manasement specialists
(e.g., the Federal Emergency Management A9ency,); and state and
local government associations (e.g., National Governors
Association) • Not one insurance company nor insurance industry
representative testified or even filed materials for the record.

d. Smokin.a.
According to findings reported by PrideMark Young & Simon,
smokers cost insurance companies 54% more for health care than do
non-smokers. It is a mass· tragedy that the life and health
insurance industries did not crusade against cigarette smoking
promotions and establish anti-smoking clinics years ago. Over

Le~ter

to

:a~es

P.

,

Pa<;~e

10.

the years, Ree~~['S ~i;~s: did
mo~e
this area than did
insurers such as Metropolita~, Prudential, the Equitable and John
Hancock.
According to safety resea~ch consultant MacCollu~, "If the
exis:ence of an effective ha2ard prevention progra~ within an
institution ~ere used as
st criteria for p~oviding
underwriting covera;e
compensation, product
liability, public 11
insurance, we would
not, today, need tc
lem of exorbitant
insurance ra:es."
s assets
soaring
prof:ts, insurance c
es have a great opportunity to
contribute :o
a
of health
safety by working to
eli~inate or reduce hazardous products, services and conditions.
A.11d the~· v:j,.:!.l
ir claims co s
the process.
Instead cf a major corn.rr.itment by Aetna in these directions,
yo~r co~pany is spen.j.ing 1
sums to prejudice public opinion
aga~nst the right~ of inp
rsons to plead before juries for
ju~:ice.
Presently, in at. lea
four states -- Cclorado,
Louisiana, St. Lcu~s and
ate
-- you are spending
many policytolder9'
llars
new
ads a~d
e:ectronic media spots. The
these
are replete
with w~ld m1s
sentations
not reflect the regular
di~p~siticn o: cases
ccu=ts.
se ads are far •• f~r :e~A
than would
ct
's
coverup of its
edge about t
-eld mutilations a
1ng explici~ly
represe~tative of
urance industry's practices.
Is this the way
s to spend money -- caricaturing
t:l.s A.'T;erica!i legal systerr. better than any Kre=nlin propagandist
co~ld de?
Does Aec~a want to provoke an aroused public agains~
its o· rageous distortions or would
r
r enlist an aroused
pJblic
o
s prevention
j
er
-- ranging from
motor cycle helreet use to sa
mo~or
c s,
cal devices
and pharmaceuticals? Let's hear from you, Mr. lynn. Which
specific projects do you
sh to have your company work on, that
are mentioned in this let r, for results, not rhetoric?

Sincerely,

lsi
Ralph Nader
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strides of the
century has been a
Accompanying the
rapid expansion in the
We know a great deal
about machine and
environmental
and
industrial accidents. Yet statistics show that the
and
nm into the millions
Researchers at the National
of Sciences say that
are the number one cause of death for Americans
years of age,
an estimated 4 million years in
In
the latest
such
caused
deaths
70 million nonfatal
including
more than
80,000 permanent disabilities 2
Today, the insurance
loss
icantly society's health and
The industry itself has enormous resources to devote to
ments. The 3,000-plus
in the United States
3
have assets totalling over $300
and over
life insurance
companies have assets
over $800 billion. 4
Yet despite its growth in size and
the insurance industry is
nowhere near the factor in loss
it achieved in the
s Even
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repeated litigation arising from well known and identical hazardous
product models or services has not prompted the insurance industry to
ins1st on elimination of avotdable dangers. Insurance companies are let·
ting hazards continue to cause accidents at increasing rates, forcing
workers and consumers to assume the risk of death or serious injury.
There are many ways insurance companies can function to control and
minimize haz.ards which cause injury or death.

J.

Disclosure of Information

Insurance companies are in a unique position to disclose information
about hazards to those responsible for ensuring safety, and to the public.
Insurance companies, however, have typically resisted information sharing outside the industry. The experience of some community anti-arson
groups in New York City, in their attempts to obtain basic information
and cooperation from insurance companies in their anti-arson efforts,
typifies this attitude. One group undertook a program to prevent many
of the most notorious properties in New York from getting fire insurance. According to a 1985 article in Citizen Participation magazine, the
group wrote to every insurance company known to provide fire insurance
in its area, offering to share with those companies some of its own credible "early-warning" data as an aid in evaluating insurance risks. 6 With
the notable exception of the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the
group's letters and phone calls drew what they termed an "unenthusiastic response. " 7 Other groups which also offered to work with insurers
reported similarly disappointing results, "raising suspicions that some insurance companies don't much care about inner-city arson, so long as the
premiums keep rolling in to cover it." 8 Similarly, in a letter published in
the New York Times, Stanley Bulbach, Director of Communities United
for Research and Education for AIDS, discussed the importance of
AIDS education in controlling the disease, but noted resistance by insurers to scale down escalating insurance claims by promoting education on
AIDS through billing newsletters.Q
By implementing a structured disclosure program, insurance companies can do a great deal to assist those responsible for making products or
services safer. For example, according to safety research consultant
David V.
former president of the American
of
Safety Engineers, insurance companies should be collecting data on
A,., for Residenlial Firt! buuranu. 15 I'Oi'\ Snm. J. 415. 411> (1987) (understanding factors
3ffecung mceniiVt'> of in~urcr\ necn..ary 10 du:il Mlpport in hazard redu,uon)
I> Deliben. Tilt• Burning Qr.u•nion. C!tUI.N P\IHICIP.\TION, Summer 1985 at 10, II
7 /d.
II. ld
9. NY Ttmn. M!u. 22. 191$7. § 3. at 20. col. 2.
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equipment, identifying injuries by particular
and maintaining a
central data hank on hazard information, narratives of occurrences and
available !>afcguard~. 1" For each claim or d1spu1ed injury, insurance companic\ should be routinely Identifying the hazard or unsafe condition
which resulted in the daim, includmg the make and model of any product that served a~ the hn;,t for the hazard, or any chemical that could
cause tox1c inJury. 11 Companies should publish annual summaries of all
death or injury-related occurrences, assuring public access to this mformation.12 Information about ultrahazardous conditions and those which
repeatedly cause serious harm should be communicated to law enforcement officiab, as well as advertised to the public. Internally, insurance
compame~ with multiple
like workers' compensation and product
liability, should forward information regarding hazards and equipment
1
from one line to another. 1

2.

Rating and Coverage

Companies should use their own rating function to penalize insureds
who do not improve safety. Insurance companies should also require
implementation of hazard prevention measures as part of the insurance
contract, particularly after a claim is submitted and specific hazard pre·
vention measure!> identified. 14 After a legitimate claim is paid, the in!>urer should routinely conduct a hazard analy<ois of the product or unsafe
circumstance and refuse to continue coverage until all the hazards un·
covered by the analysis are removed and the risk of injury reduced. 15
How often do insurers with their engineers accomplish these missions?

3.

Regulatory Agencies

also be effective advocates for safety im·
Virtually all regulatory :u11•ru••.-..
opportunities for outside
process. For years, citi·
zens have taken
of these
petitioning agencies such as
the Consumer Product Safety Commission for product standards, or the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for nuclear safety standards, or asking
for the removal of toxic,
or pharmaceutical hazards. Yet insurance companies, with many more finam.:ial re!>ources than the average
lO D Mar\.\>llum. Thcr,· " No Such Thing A,, A tml'ulity Cn,l\-lt·, The
I!Jt.m.l l'rc\tlllhlll lhJt', l!unmp. ll'' 4·5 !ullpuhli,hetl manu,nrptl.
ll /d
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ci!Jzen, have largely stayed clear of regulatory
Even in the
safety area, only the Insurance Institute for H1ghway Safety, which does
not consider itself an insurance industry trade association, has
occasionally for auto safety recalls and even more rarely for new or
stronger motor vehicle safety standards.
Without question, improved safety regulations could have a direct impact on insurance claims. In the fire prevention area, regulations requiring more fire resistant mattresses and furniture, which went into effect in
the 1970s, have had some effect in reducing household fires. According to
figures compiled by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 4,240
Americans died in 623,000 residential fires in 1984, down from 757,500
home fires and 5,500 deaths reported in 1980. 16 But this figure still remains higher per capita than many other nations, according to James F.
Hoebel, manager of the commission's Fire and Thermal Burn Hazards
Office. 17

4.

683

) car~. hut we are \I ill talking about
who are used lo
with
he linam:1al ekmcn!\ of n~k control. The eng111t~crmg aspect 1:. !>Ome·
f01 whtch corpora lion~ have not yet seen tht~ benefit of allocating
fund'>. Even msureP;, m thetr loss-control departments, have no! by
.
20
and large allocated ~tgmlicant f un d s tor engmcenng.
~

In add111on. even where engineers are on staff in insurance company
control departments, they may be without relevant experience or
training m the field of safety. According to safety research consultant
MacCollum,
los~

Generally the engineer with training in a conventional discipline has
littlr pradical knowledge in the field of hazard prevention. Currently
only a ft·w ~dmols teach ha:tard prevention principles to undergraduate
engmccrs. Such courses are elective and are not a requirement to obtam a degree, and, therefore, a very small percentage of engineers have
been exposed to any in~tructmn on the methodology necessary to identify and control ha:tards 21

Litigation

Related to their regulatory responsibilities, insurance companies can
seek enforcement of health and safety standards through judicial proceedings. Unforlunately, most contact which insurance companies have
with the court system is in fighting claims and essentially defending
hazards. A luminous exception occurred when State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the nation's largest insurance company,
petitioned the United States Court of Appeals to review the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) 1981-rescission of
the automatic restraint standard.'M In June, 1983, the United States
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the State Farm position and found
the NHTSA decision illegal. 19

5.

FUNCTION

Research and Development

Insurance companies devote minimal effort and resources towards research and development in the area of hazard or disea!.e prevention. According to David M. Pharis, president of the Philadelphia-based S.T.
Hudson Inlernational which specializes in loss control, quoted in the
May 21, 1986 Journal of Commerce,
[T)he quality of [ri~kJ managers has improved considerably over the
16 Tougher Sll:mdurd.t Help Reduce Ftre Toll. l CoM .. Aug 20, 1986. at lh.
17. Jd
Ill ':>tate farm Mut Auto lm•. Co. v. Dqlartment of Tran'r. 6SO F2d 206. 2

Cn 1'152 1
1'1 Mowr Vduck Mft: A"'n ' Stattt Farm Mul. Au~<• In,. Co. 46.1 lJ S 2'1.
I l'ltih lhr ..:nun .:ondudcd the agenq f;ukd to M.!pply I he requi\Hc .. rea,oned ~nal>'" ..
lh .:ha11ge <>f
ld. at

6.

Selling Standards in Their Own Shop

insurance companies -should set their own loss prevention and hazard
control examples. For example, by the end of 1986, the Travelers Insurance Company should have completed conversion of its entire fleet to
driver-side air bag cars. According to Travelers' Senior Vice-President
Peter Lihassi, "Looked at from a purely economic point of view, our
investment has already paid for itself. The hospitalization and rehabilita·
tion co~ts, lost work time, or possible death benefits would have exceeded
the actual cmt of equipping our cars with air bags." 22 Allstate and
Aetna insurance companies have also purchased air bag cars for their
fleets. Others, such as Prudential, have not.
As another example, according to findings reported by PrideMark
Young & Simon, smokers cost insurance companies 54% more for health
care than do nonsmokers. ' In a recent letter to the New York Times,
G. Kar~on, Dm:~.:tor of the Center for Corporate Public Involvement, noted that some insurance companies have taken the positive step
of
smoking in their
offices or have restricted smoking
that the life and health
to certam designated area-.. 24 It is a mass
in'ourance industries did not crusade
smoking promo~
tions and cstahlish antismoking clinics years ago. The Reader's Digest
Z.llh\\JC/. Rt1i. JfuthJJ;cn' Roh• Expo11<1!, J. CoM .. May 21, 1986, at I -Ia, col. 3
D MacC••IIum. 111pru lillie 10, al 24
" ··1"'""-r' fl.,~ it ... Itt II Rt v I 1.1 (Aug./Sept
No. l,
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did far more in this area than insurers such as Metropolitan, Prudential,
the Equitable, and John Hancock.
The insurance industry's overall indifference to loss prevention-their
failure to apply these functions to major environmental, product and professional hazards-has been a significant contributor to the "insurance
cnsis" of the mid-1980s. Consumers and businesses have been hll with
skyrocketing insurance premiums, reduced coverage, and arbitrary cancellations. According to safety research consultant MacCollum, "(i]f the
existence of an effective hazard prevention program withjn an institution
were used as the foremost criteria for providing underwriting coverage
for worker's compensation, product liability, public liability, and other
such insurance, we would not, today, need to be addressing the problem
of exorbitant insurance rates. " 25
In October, 1986, Richard Wade, International Technology Corporation's Director of Environmental Risk Management Services, said in a
panel discussion on pollution liability, that pollution liability risks would
be more insurable if there were more attention paid to risk assessment
and risk control. In particular, he said most pollution risk assessments
fail to evaluate accident probability and emergency response plans so
that accidental chemical spills can be cleaned up before contaminating
the ground water. He also described most problems as the result of inadequate maintenance, improper training of workers, or too little capital
paying for safeguards. 26 Another panelist, Michael Baram of the Boston
University School of Medicine, criticized the insurance industry's failure
to use environmental specialists or epidemiologists who can assess the
relationship between substances and illness in risk assessments. 27
The insurance industry, in some cases, has even provoked those responsible for safety protection into ignoring loss prevention. In a recent
phone conversation, Tim Holt, Executive Vice President of the National
School Supply and Equipment Association, stated that the group has not
had much time "to devote to safety" due to the "distraction" of trying to
find and maintain adequate insurance coverage during the insurance crisis. "Liability has distracted us from the task of creating safer products,"
said Holt. "Consumers are the ones who suffer."
According to loss control specialist Pharis,
Insurers spend approximately 70% of their money on losses. Some
20% is spent on commissions and operating expenses. Perhap~ 6%
shows up in expenses for salaries and expenses for claims people and
underwriters. Nevertheless, when the [people] at the top begm worrying
25. Ma.:Collum, supro note 10, a1 I
26 Young. Group To Toke On Environmental Rislu, J. CoM., (kl 2'1, 19Xo.
27. Jd.
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ahnut poor lo~' ratio~. everybody ~tarts attacking the 6%. They begin
cuttmg hac!- on staff and '>alarics anJ talk about bad pricing. But
what'~ really killing them is that 70% in losse-; 2 M
One rca!>on msurance companies have become uninterested in doing
'omcthing about loss prevention is that they have become predominantly
ca~h llow linancial institutions, and have moved away from their risk
management functions. More and more attention is being paid to increa..,ing investment income through premium volume. They pay Jess attention to safety and engineering contributions that could reduce
premium~ but retain prudent underwriting profits. For example, in the
early 19HOs when interest rates were high, the industry cut prices in order
to obtain premium dollars to invest at high interest rates. The companies
wanted premiums so quickly for high interest bearing investments that
they even sold a $75 million retroactive insurance policy for the 1981
MGM Grand Hotel fire in Nevada-after the fire. 29
These days, because of the investment income generated, an insurance
industry executive would rather charge a $200 premium and risk paying
out $100 in claims, than charge a $100 premium and risk paying out $50
in claims.
On January 20, 1987, we launched a survey of eleven major United
States property/casualty company foundations to determine whether Joss
prevention, hazard prevention, or system safety programs are accorded
high priorities for grants or other contributions. Our preliminary responses are not particularly encouraging for prevention of casualties.
I. Of $6,796,018 total grants in 1985 by the Aetna Life and Casualty Company Foundation, the only safety contribution was $5,000 to
an Indianapolis, Indiana, Volunteer Fire Department. 311 Approximately $195,000 went to health care programs and institutional chantie~ for the handicapped. According to The Foundation Center Source
Book Profile, the foundation docs not support medical research. Intere,tmgly, however, the Aetna Foundation recently gave a grant to the
National Center for Small Communities to study ways to prevent muntc•pal msurance-related loss in small communities. The results are still
pending, but according to the National Association of Towns and
Townships, in-depth interviews with sixteen insurance and risk management experts revealed that officials "generally felt [that) towns and
town~htps ought to appeal to in!>urers themselves for expertise in de2X.

Zul~ew•o. 1upra
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signing and operating risk reduction activitie~." 31
2. In 1985, American Financial Corporation Foundatton ofCincmnati, Oh1o, gave no safety grants. 12 The foundatton gave appro:lllmatdy
$20,<XXl to health related charities and around $2 mtllion to hospital,.
3. As a policy, The Chubb Foundation of Warren, New Jersey,
awards no grants for loss prevention programs. H Thetr grants constst
only of scholarships to dependents and relatives of employee~ for college or junior college degrees. 34 Chubb does publish a brochure
describing its loss control services. JS
4. In 198'5, The Continental Corporation Foundation of New York,
New York, gave a number of small matching grants, most under $100,
and some larger grants totalling less than $ IO,<XXl, to various he all h
care programs and charities. No contributions were made to safety
programs. 36
5. Farmers Insurance Group Safety Foundation of Los Angeles,
California, would not respond to our survey, but 1985 public records
show $3,<XXl in contributions to safety-oriented groups, and $1,<XXl to
health care programs. 37
6. In 1985, The Travelers Companies Foundation, Inc. of Hartford,
Connecticut, gave $10,<XXl to safety programs, 38 and several hundred
thousand dollars to geriatric care and research, infant care, and health
care. Travelers also noted "a long history of supporting safety mea'>ures that reduce automobile accident deaths," including support of
mandatory seat belt laws and federal legislation to mandate air bags or
some other nonbelt automatic protection for the front seat."'
7. The USF&G Foundation of Baltimore, Maryland, did not respond to our survey with a list of contributions, although they noted
that some health care and safety programs received granls in 1985.~"
The foundation did outline safety surveys conducted by the company
JJ NATION ... t ASSOCIATION OF TOWNS AND TOWNSHIPS, MANAGIM.> RI~K I~ S~.t\11
TOWN AMERICA, PRELIMINARY REPORT 3 (1987).
32. Income Tu Rerurn for 1985, Form 990, American Fmancial Corporauon Fnundalion.
The foundauon ga\le approximalely S20,000 10 health related charille!o and around $I nulhon
10 ho~patal~ /d.
33 Telephone interview conducted by Ruth Ann Paui'>On wilh Hcnr} Harder. Chut>h
Foundation (Mar. 12. 1987).
34. /d.; see THI: CHUBB FOUl' DATION, A CAll. FOR APPIIC,\TIOI'S ION S( llUI \M~Ifii'S
TO 81. AWAIIDt.D IN Rt.COLM fiON 01· ACIIILVLMI:N'I (1'1!!6)
35. CHt:BB GIIOJ..P OF INSUIIANCt COMPANILS, Loss CONTROl,

Till VII \I

La~a.;

(19!!6).
36. Income Tax Return for 1985, Form 990. The Continental Corporation Found.llll)Jl
.n Income Tu Re!Urn for 19M5. Form 990, Farmers Insurance Group Safel~ Founda1111n
JH Lefler from Ern(SI L O..bome, Pre\adent, The Travelel'\ Companie' Fouud~lum. ln.:.
to Ralph Nader (Feb. 16, 1987).

.w ld
40 lener from E Donald Bangs, Executive Vice President. USF&G Foundation. lo
Ralph Nader (feb 4. 1987).
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and :.lated support for seat belts for its fleet and for air bags "when
made available."
K.

Cigna FoundatiOn of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, has not reto our survey.

~pondcd

9. American International Group Foundation of New York, New
York, ha~ 1ssued no response to date.
10. CNA Insurance Company Foundation of Chicago, Illinois refused to respond. 41
II. St. Paul Companies of St. Paul, Minnesota, has issued no response to date.
Another informal survey of this country's major auto insurance carriers reveals that some insurance companies are providing financial incentives to encourage purchases of cars equipped with air bags.
Travelers offers medical premium discounts-IS% to policyholders
with a driver-side air bag or 30% for those with a full front seat air bag.
The savings for an average policyholder with a 1987 Volvo containing a
driver-side air bag would be around $30 per year. With a full front seat
bag, the savings would double to $60 per year. To qualify for this deduction, the purchaser must have a signed paper verifying the air bag's installation at the time of purchase. 4 2
Allstate offers discounts on total medical and comprehensive premi·
ums-20% to policyholders with a driver-side air bag and 30% to those
with a full front seat air bag. This discount does not apply to collision
insurance. 4 J
Nationwide offers discounts on total medical and comprehensive premiums-25% to policyholders with a driver-side air bag and 40% to
those with a full front seat air bag. This amounts to almost $80 per year
for average policyholders with a fully-equipped full front seat air bag. 44
Starting on March 23, 1987, Prudential is offering a 30% medical premium discount for policyholders with full front seat air bags, provided
the consumer verifies the air bag purchase. 45
The Hartford Insurance Group, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance.
Company, Aetna Life and Casualty, and Safeco have adopted an advi41 Leiter from Suzanne J. Reade, Public Affairs Consultant, CNA Insurance Company
Foundauon. 10 Ralph Nader (Mar. 18, 1987).
42. Telephone interview conducted by J1m Mussleman with Peter Libusi, The Travelers
Companies (Mar. 5, 1987).
4.1 Telephone interview conducted by Jim Mussleman with Bob Montgomery, Allstate
Jn,urancc Company (Mar. 23. 1987).
44. Telephone interview conducted by Jim Muulernan with Becky Wasenjo, Nationwide
Jn,uran.:c Company (Mar. 23, 1987)

45. Telephone mtenriew conducted by Jim Muuleman with !vall Lu1o, Prudcnti11l Insurance Company !May 7, 1987).
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sory rule of the Insurance Services Organization 4 t. which recommends a
30% medical premium discount for a full front seat atr bag and a 20%
medical premium discount for a driver's side air bag. 47
State Farm offers no discount for air bag equipped cars, claiming a
lack of available actuarial data that air bags cut down insurance costs. 4 "
Besides offering di!>counts, insurance companies should encourage air
bag retrofitting. Companies should increase donations to pro-air bag
public safety organizations.
In the medical malpractice area, insurance companies should be seeking to decrease the large number of unnecessary operations, X-rays, and
drug prescriptions, improve the handling of X-ray equipment, improve
the quality of emergency and intensive care, reduce hosp1tal mfect1ons,
and increase peer review.
Much improvement can be made in the area of emergency care. A
recent study of claims files managed by the Risk Management Foundation of the Harvard Medical Institutions, relating to clinical fellows
moonlighting outside of institutions where they were employed between
April, 1976, to October, 1986, found that physicians with fellowships 111
internal medicine and its subspecialties were at greatest risk of emergency room related moonlighting claims.. 49 In a recent article, the foundation encouraged risk managers and insurance programs to strengthen
loss prevention programs in the emergency room setting; to enforce a
stringent credentialling process to all physician applicants including
those for moonlighting positions; to monitor and evaluate care regularly
as part of the hospital-wide risk management and quality assurance programs; and to support strong loss prevention programs through additions
or modifications to insurance underwriting criteria such as by requmng
additional evidence of pertinent training for fellows who desire to moonlight in emergency rooms. so Very few malpractice insurance companies
do anything regarding loss prevention or provide the state med1cal licensing review board with evidence of serious physician malpractice.
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the country and should be promoted by insurance companies. 51 The
components of the safety program include:
-Development of forms which tell parents and participants of the
ri~ks and potential dangers in graphic, comprehensive detail.

-Formation of safety guidelines for each sport to give to coaches.
-Traming of coaches in the area of sports medicine (31 hours).
-A record-keepmg mechanism which details training done and injuries received every day. The record-keeping helps discover patterns in
injune~ which may be cues that something is wrong.
-Requirement of a physician's authorization before an athlete may
return after a malady or mjury. There is also coach involvement in the
rehabilitation program.
The Texas School Services Foundation has another model program to
which insurance companies should pay close attention. 52 Included are:
-Pre-employment screening to determine what physical labor an
employee can sustain.
-Investigations after every accident, once to recommend ways to
make the workplace safer, and again to ensure that the recommendation~ are acted upon.,
-A risk control manual for distribution to the school.
Lo~s prevention provides the insurance industry with great opportunity to combine its vested interest in profits with social contribmions to
health and safety. By insisting on the elimination or reduction of hazardous products, services, and conditions, insurance companies can become
the sentinels for health and safety. They will not perform those missions
as long as they spend millions of dollars in advertised demands to restrict
victims' rights, diminish
and inflate a phony lawsuit crisis into
a corporate strategy for callous abdication of loss prevention
responsibilities.

In areas of school sports safety, the Seattle schools have an athletic
safety program which has been a model for safety programs throughout
40. Tekphone mterview conducted by J1m Mu~sleman with Rea Tyler. ln,urance lll\totuh:
for Htgh•u) Safety (Apr. 16. 1987).
47. Telephone inteniew conducted b~ Jtm Mu~~leman with June Bruce. lmuranc<' s~n ·
tee-. Orttaniullon (Apr. lb. 19K7). let' Pa.mve R,•,trulllt DIIWIIIII, (i-5 I?>.St.:M \'<CI Stk\'ICI s
OHilt. PIU'-AII: PAssi.MiHt Anor.~oi!Ht M~'' "' (1983!.
4M T dephone interview •:onduc·ted h) Jtm Mu\\lcman wuh L.aura Sulhvan. State Farm
lnwran<r Comp.n~ (Mar. 23. !9~7)
.
.
49. Rtsll. :\h'-'<·1 \H' 1 FoL
Clm~tul I cllow.\ wuh f.tmllt'd f.m<''II<'III'Y Can·
Etpmena Target• uf "Mounltghtmg" Cla1ms. 8 FOMl:M 6·7. 14 (Jan.-Apr I9M7)
50. ld at 7. 14.
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51 Telephone interview conducted by Ruth Ann Paui'IOI'I with 0~ Gregory, Genenl
Cmm~el. Nal!onaf School Boord~ Association (Mar. 20. 191!7).
52. ld.

